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This paper studies a general equilibrium model with an investor controlled ﬁrm. Share-
holders can vote on the ﬁrm’s production plan in an assembly. Prior to that they may
trade shares on the stock market. Since stock market trades determine the distribution of
votes, trading is strategic. There is always an equilibrium, where share trades lead to own-
ers deciding for competitive behavior, but there may also be equilibria, where monoplistic
behavior prevails.
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Economic agents are aﬀected by the activity of ﬁrms in two ways. First, as investors
they receive dividends derived from the ﬁrms’ revenues. Second, as consumers they are
aﬀected by externalities generated by ﬁrms. Those may be externalities in the narrow sense
(pollution, innovation, etc.) or simply the fact that ﬁrms’ production decisions aﬀect market
prices.
Under perfect competition agents are not aware of how ﬁrms’ production activities aﬀect
prices, because they take prices as given. Therefore, in this case all shareholders unani-
mously want the ﬁrms to maximize proﬁts. But under imperfectly competitive conditions
agents, who understand how ﬁrms aﬀect prices, will also understand how they themselves
are aﬀected by the ﬁrms’ decisions. This leads to a failure of shareholder unanimity and
constitutes the simplest case, where economic agents hold heterogenous views about what
ﬁrms ought to do.
In such cases control over ﬁrms becomes an issue. In modern industrialized societies
investors’ control over ﬁrms is institutionalized through property and control rights. While
a variety of securities separate property from control rights (e.g. bonds or preferred stocks),
the core institution of equity combines them. This creates an industrial democracy distinct
from political democracy in two ways. First, a ﬁrm’s equity owners have a direct saying
on the company’s operation in proportion to their property rights, through voting in share-
holder assemblies (“one-share-one-vote”). Second, and again unlike political democracy,
voting shares can be traded at the stock market.
Despite a wide recognition that empirically control commands value (e.g. Zingales, 1994;
Rydqvist, 1996; Modigliani and Perotti, 1997; Nenova, 2003) little seems to be known about
the interaction of these two aspects in theory. The literature on takeover bids has focussed
on a partial equilibrium framework, where, ﬁrst, the control-threshold and the identity of
the bidder are exogenous and, second, takeovers only aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm about which
investors otherwise agree (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1988; Bagnoli
and Lipman, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi, 1998). A similar partial equilibrium approach is often used in modelling
shareholder voting (e.g. Maug and Yilmaz, 2002).
General equilibrium treatments have concentrated on the objective function of the ﬁrm,
ignoring shareholder voting and the conﬂict that the desire to control creates at the stock
market (e.g. Milne, 1981; Haller, 1986; Grodal, 1996; Dierker and Grodal, 1996; Dierker and
Grodal, 1999). Few papers have tried to integrate shareholder voting and the interaction
on the stock market in a general equilibrium framework. The few that we are aware of
include Renstr¨ om and Yal¸ cin (2003), Bejan (2003), and Kelsey and Milne (forthcoming) on
imperfect competition, and Dr` eze (1974), DeMarzo (1993), and Bejan (2004) on incomplete
market economies.
This paper studies a general equilibrium model with a monopolist ﬁrm that is controlled
by investors through shareholder voting. As agents understand how the ﬁrm’s policy will
inﬂuence market conditions, there is scope for shareholder disagreement. Thus, the model
provides a general equilibrium foundation for the notion of private beneﬁts of control that
1is frequently used in the literature on corporate governance (e.g. Holmstr¨ om and Tirole,
1997). Prior to the shareholder assembly investors can trade their shares at the stock
market, thereby determining the distribution of votes and the extent of control.
We ﬁnd that there is always an equilibrium, where after trade at the stock market
shareholders decide for the eﬃcient production plan, that is, they make the ﬁrm behave
competitively. On the other hand, there may also be equilibria, where shareholders decide
in favor of monopolistic behavior. The latter tend to be associated with a concentrated
ownership structure, while the former are associated with more dispersed ownership. Only
when stock market trades are coordinated by some central agency (in a transferable utility
model) monopolistic ﬁrm behavior disappears. Thus, the model provides a theory of the
ﬁrm’s competitive conduct that is driven by the ownership structure, rather than the market
structure.
The model is admittedly stylized in order to focus on the key issues. In a more general
model many feedback eﬀects would appear that are shut down in the present model. But it
turns out that the interactions are suﬃciently complex even in the present model, so that
in order to isolate intuition the simpliﬁcations are justiﬁed.
The rest of the paper is organized according to backwards induction. Section 2 sets
out the basic model and analyses consumption decisions in the ﬁnal period, after the ﬁrm’s
production plan has been decided. Section 3 considers shareholder voting in an assembly
which determines the ﬁrm’s production plan prior to commodity markets. Section 4 provides
an equilibrium notion for the initial stage of strategic trading at the stock market, ﬁrst
for tender oﬀers, and then for general control trades. Section 5 concludes and discusses
implications. Lengthy proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Economy
The model encompasses an arbitrary (but ﬁnite) number of economic agents and a single
ﬁrm. Agents come endowed with a composite commodity that is perfectly divisible, and
with ownership shares in the ﬁrm. They wish to consume the composite commodity and a
second commodity, that is exclusively produced by the ﬁrm and comes in discrete, indivisible
units.
The interaction extends over three stages. At the initial stage agents can trade shares
at a stock market. When the stock market closes, ownership shares are “frozen” and a
shareholder assembly may be called. This is the second stage: At the assembly shareholders
can decide to participate and vote on the ﬁrm’s production plan under simple majority rule,
where one share counts as one vote. Given the outcome of shareholder voting, at the ﬁnal
stage commodity markets open, consumers spend their incomes, and consumption goods
prices are determined. This last stage is a standard Cournot-Walras model, as in Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972). The three stages are now explained in detail, working backwards from the
last to the ﬁrst.
22.1 Commodity Markets
Consider an economy with n agents, i ∈ I = {1,...,n}, and two goods, l = 0,1. Good l = 0
(the composite commodity) is perfectly divisible and can serve both as a consumption good
and as a factor of production. Every agent has initially (at the ﬁrst stage) an endowment
ω0 > 0 with good l = 0, i.e. ei = (ω0,0) for all i ∈ I. Commodity l = 1 is indivisible and is
produced by the only ﬁrm in the economy from good l = 0 via a technology that converts
c > 0 units of good l = 0 into one unit of good l = 1.1
Agents’ utilities are quasi-linear in good l = 0. Each agent i has a valuation (“willingness
to pay”) vi > 0 for one unit of commodity l = 1 (and valuation zero for more than one
unit). Agent i’s indirect utility function at income wi = w and relative price p = p1/p0 is,
therefore,
Ui (p,w) = w + max{0,vi − p} (1)
For the sake of tractability it is assumed that there are only two types of agents, those
with high valuation vi = v and those with low valuation vi = v, where c ≤ v < v ≤ 1. Let
H = {i ∈ I |vi = v} and L = {i ∈ I |vi = v} and denote by m = |H| the number of agents
with high valuation, 1 ≤ m < n. Then, the aggregate demand function for commodity l = 1





v if 0 ≤ y ≤ m
v if m < y ≤ n
0 if n < y
(2)
when y is the ﬁrm’s output.
Agents are also shareholders in the ﬁrm, with i owning share θi ≥ 0, where
P
i∈I θi = 1.
Therefore, at relative price p and output y agent i’s wealth wi is given by wi = ωi +
θi (p − c)y, where ωi − θicy is agent i’s interim endowment with good l = 0 and θiy is her
interim endowment with good l = 1. The part ωi of i’s interim endowment with good l = 0
derives from her initial endowment ei0 = ω0 minus i’s expenditure for share purchases, or
plus i’s revenue from share sales at the stock market. Hence, i’s indirect utility from the
ﬁrm’s decision y is given by





ωi + θi [v − c]y if 0 ≤ y ≤ m
ωi + θi [v − c]y if m < y ≤ n and vi = v
ωi + θi [v − c]y + v − v if m < y ≤ n and vi = v
ωi − θicy + vi if n < y
(3)
The maximum of the ﬁrst line under curly brackets (under the constraint 0 ≤ y ≤ m)
obtains at y = m. The maximum of the second and third line under curly brackets (subject
to m < y ≤ n) obtains at y = n (uniquely so if c < v). And the last line under curly brackets
1 Under constant returns to scale it is diﬃcult to see why there is a single ﬁrm even though each agent
could run his own ﬁrm and produce as eﬃciently. To avoid this, a small but positive ﬁxed cost could be
assumed without changing the analysis.
3is strictly decreasing in y with a maximum at y = n + 1. Denote by π = [v − c]m > 0 the
maximum proﬁt at the high price p = v (low output, y = m) and by π = [v − c]n ≥ 0 the
maximum proﬁt at the low price p = v (high output, y = n).
The indirect utility function Vi in (3) is clearly not single-peaked (quasi-concave). This
is fairly typical for models like this. Even with perfect divisibility and in regular cases, like
with Cobb-Douglas preferences, the induced indirect utility function over a ﬁrm’s output will
be strictly convex for low shareholdings and (at least) triple-peaked for higher shareholdings.
This is because an agent, who holds almost no shares cares exclusively about the externality,
while for an investor, who holds more shares, the proﬁt motive becomes more important.
The failure of single-peakedness forbids the application of the median voter theorem, which
would otherwise be a feasible theory of control for publicly held corporations.2 A reordering
(as in Roberts, 1977) cannot turn preferences single-peaked either, because “types” are in
fact two-dimensional, consisting of valuations vi and shares θi.
2.2 Bliss Points
If a shareholder had to choose the ﬁrm’s production plan, she would face a trade-oﬀ: As a
recipient of dividends she wants the ﬁrm to realize high proﬁts; as a consumer she wants
high levels of output so as to lower the consumption good price. The ﬁrst aspect is more
important for large blockholders, while high-valuation types with small shareholdings are
more sensitive to the second. Since high levels of output (low price) may be inconsistent with
high proﬁts, a conﬂict of interest between shareholders may arise for a certain parameter
range. In particular, low-valuation types and large blockholders may prefer to constrain
output, while high-valuation types with few shares will wish to expand output so as to
lower prices. In quantitative terms the optimal production plans from the individual agents’
viewpoints are summarized in the ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 Given the share θi owned by agent i ∈ I and her type vi ∈ {v,v}, her most
preferred production plan is given by the following table:
π > π 0 ≤ θi < α α ≤ θi < β β ≤ θi ≤ γ γ < θi
vi = v y = n + 1 y = m y = m y = m
vi = v y = n + 1 y = n + 1 y = n y = m
π ≤ π 0 ≤ θi < β β ≤ θi
vi = v y = n + 1 y = n












with α < 1/m, β < 1/n, π > π ⇒ γ ≤ 1/m, and π > π ⇔ α < β.
2 Some authors apply the median voter theorem in analoguous contexts nevertheless, e.g. Renstr¨ om and
Yal¸ cin (2003). Similarly, the use of ﬁrst-order conditions, as in Kelsey and Milne (forthcoming), is not always
justiﬁed in models of this class.
4Proof: See Appendix.
For the parameter constellation π ≤ π the bliss points of shareholders depend only on
their holdings θi, but not on their types. All shareholders with shares below β (< 1/n) favor
a zero price (y = n+1), and all shareholders with shares above β favor the low price p = v
(y = n). No shareholder will ever want a high price. With this parameter constellation,
therefore, the choice would only be between giving away the ﬁrm’s produce for free and
serving all potential customers. This is why we regard this case as less interesting. Instead,
we will concentrate on the upper part of the table.
There, π > π obtains and a conﬂict between shareholders with equal shares, but diﬀerent
types, can arise (for shares that are at least α < 1/m). With shares between α and β low-
valuation types favor a high price, but high-valuation types prefer a zero price. With shares
between β and γ low-valuation types continue to prefer a high price, but high-valuation types
favor a low price. Only with shares above γ the two types again agree on the high price.
Since γ can be large (as compared to α), when π−π > 0 becomes small compared to v−v, the
region of potential conﬂict can be wide. (The coeﬃcient γ measure the relative importance
of the externality versus the proﬁt increment.) Therefore, we henceforth concentrate on the
case π > π.
Moreover, it will be assumed that the alternatives of the ﬁrm are restricted to y = m
(low output, high price) and y = n (high output, low price). This is for three reasons. First,
a zero price entails negative proﬁts. If this were an equilibrium outcome, rational investors,
foreseeing that the ﬁrm will lose money, would not invest into shares in the ﬁrst place—so,
the ﬁrm would not come into existence in equilibrium. Second, only investors with very
small shares (below β < 1/n) will favor a zero price. Most likely, a shareholder assembly,
where excessive output is proposed, can never be won. Third, a binary decision of the ﬁrm
avoids the preference aggregation problems that are familiar from social choice theory (see
also Section 3). In summary, we assume the following parameter restrictions.
Assumption: y ∈ {m,n}, π > π, c < v, and ω0 > π + v.
The ﬁrst two assumptions have been explained. The third assumes a generic parameter
constellation that avoids ties. The fourth assumes a suﬃciently large endowment with the
composite commodity to avoid results that are driven by wealth constraints. It eﬀectively
means that every investor has, in principle, suﬃcient resources to buy all stocks at the high
ﬁrm value π, can even pay a control premium equal to the price diﬀerence v − v, and can
still aﬀord to buy good l = 1 at the low price p = v. That is, a low-valuation type could
buy all shares from a high-valuation type, who originally owns all shares, at the post-trade
value of the ﬁrm and could compensate the high-valuation seller for the resulting utility loss.
Likewise, a high-valuation type could buy all shares from the single low-valuation owner at
the pre-trade value of the ﬁrm, thus compensating the seller for the proﬁt loss, and could
still aﬀord to buy good l = 1 even at the high price p = v. This assumption avoids that
nonnegativity constraints bind on the consumption of the composite commodity l = 0 in
the share trades to be considered below.
These are restrictive assumptions applied to an already restrictive model, of course. Yet,
in general models of this type, without quasi-linear preferences, the market clearing price p
5will depend on the whole share distribution, and so will bliss points. Moreover, bliss points
will vary with individual shareholdings even locally. In the present model bliss points do
depend on the investor’s shareholdings, when considered over the whole range. But locally
they are constant. These simpliﬁcations make the model tractable.
Among the two possible output choices of the ﬁrm, y = m and y = n, the eﬃcient one
is y = n. For, by quasi-linearity of utility there exists a (welfare) representative consumer




Vi (θi,y) = nω0 + [p(y) − c]y + mmax{0,v − p(y)} (4)
because
P
i∈I ωi = nω0 − q
P
i∈I (θi − ϑi) = nω0 by stock market clearing, where ϑi is i’s
initial share and q the stock market price of shares. Since V (n)−V (m) = (n − m)(v − c) >
0, it follows that y = n is welfare maximizing. Henceforth we refer to y = n as the eﬃcient
production plan and to y = m as the monopolistic production plan.
2.3 Budget Constraints
In principle there are two possibilities to account for budget constraints. One is a sequence
of two budget constraints, one for the stock market and one for commodity markets. This
would imply a market incompleteness, as agents would not be permitted to take credit, and
it would require the speciﬁcation of a third commodity against which shares are traded.
The other possibility, adopted here, is a single budget constraint that extends over all
three stages of the model. For each i ∈ I this is of the form
ω0 + θiπ + qϑi ≥ pz1 + qθi (5)
where z1 ∈ {0,1} is the purchasing decision of the indivisible commodity l = 1, q is the
stock market price, ϑi is i’s initial endowment with shares, and both π and p depend on
the ﬁrm’s output y.
Since ﬁrst-date transactions at the stock market enter this budget constraint, it has to
hold for all production plans of the ﬁrm. On the other hand, a single budget constraint ﬁts
better with general equilibrium than a sequence of two budget constraints would. Moreover,
a single budget constraint allows agents to take credit on account of their future income. It
thus allows for debt ﬁnanced share acquisitions. Such debt ﬁnanced bootstrap acquisitions
have been important in the US takeover wave of the 1980ties (see M¨ uller and Panunzi,
2004).
The single budget constraint implies for agent i ∈ I that




ω0 + θiπ − v if y = n
ω0 + θiπ − v if y = m and vi = v
ω0 + θiπ if y = m and vi = v
(6)
Since π > π > 0 and ω0 > v > v were assumed, the right hand side of this budget constraint
is always at least as larger as ω0 −v > π > 0. Therefore, at any stock price, which does not
exceed the highest possible ﬁrm value, every investor can aﬀord to buy all stocks.
63 Shareholder Voting
Shareholders’ bliss points determine their voting behavior on the ﬁrm’s production plan in a
shareholder assembly. By the assumption that y ∈ {m,n} the vote among shareholders is a
binary decision. This avoids the well-known preference aggregation problems, like Arrow’s
(1963) impossibility, which would otherwise surface in the model with three alternatives.
Example 1 As a concrete example consider a case with three shareholders, n = 3, and
three alternatives, y ∈ {m,n,n + 1}. For parameters choose v = 1, v = 1/2, and c = 1/4,
so that π = 3/2 and π = 3/4, α = 1/5, β = 2/7, γ = 2/3, and η = v/(π + c(n + 1)) = 2/5.
Now assume that L = {1}, H = {2,3}, and θ1 = θ2 = 0.27, so that θ3 = 0.46.
Since the low-valuation agent 1 holds a share θ1 with α = 0.2 < θ1 = 0.27 < β = 0.2857,
she ranks the monopolistic output y = m above excessive output y = n + 1 and the latter
above the eﬃcient output y = n. The small high-valuation shareholder owns θ2 = 0.27 <
β = 0.2857 and, therefore, ranks excessive output y = n+1 above the eﬃcient output y = n
and the latter above monopolistic output y = m. The large high-valuation investor holds a
share with η = 0.4 < θ3 < γ = 0.6667. Consequently, she ranks the eﬃcient output y = n
above the monopolistic output y = m and the latter above excessive output y = n + 1.
Suppose, for the moment, that voting in a shareholder assembly is costless and all share-
holders participate. When excessive output y = n + 1 (zero price) runs against eﬃcient
output y = n (low price), the former wins with the support of the low-valuation type i = 1
and the small high-valuation investor i = 2 (as θ1 + θ2 = 0.54) against i = 3. When the
eﬃcient output y = n (low price) runs against monopolistic output y = m (high price), the
former wins with the support of the two high-valuation shareholders i = 2 and i = 3 (as
θ2 + θ3 = 0.73) against the low-valuation type i = 1. Finally, when monopolistic output
y = m (high price) runs against excessive output y = n + 1 (zero price), the former wins
with the support of the low-valuation investor i = 1 and the large high-valuation shareholder
i = 3 (as θ1 + θ3 = 0.73) against the small high-valuation type i = 2. Thus, the social
preference ordering induced by simple majority voting exhibits a Condorcet cycle.
The assumption of only two feasible production plans ﬁnesses this problem. Further-
more, we adopt a strategic model of shareholder voting with small participation costs,
instead of a normative social choice approach. Strategic voting models with participation
costs were pioneered by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) for political elections, and
adapted to shareholder voting by Ritzberger (2005).
3.1 Shareholder Assembly
After the stock market closes, shares are frozen and a shareholder assembly is called. The
assembly works as follows. Every shareholder (i ∈ I with θi > 0) decides whether or not to
participate and, if she does, how to cast her vote for one of the two alternatives y = n and
y = m. Yet, participation in the assembly carries a small privately born cost—similar to
a “lexicographic” preference to get one’s preferred alternative without participation. The
decision in the assembly is taken with simple majority of represented votes, where one
7share counts for one vote. When ties occur in the voting, a coin is ﬂipped to determine the
outcome.3
The assumption of small participation costs implies that an agent will participate in the
assembly if and only if her probability of being pivotal times the associated beneﬁt is at
least as large as the participation cost. And once an agent participates, she casts her vote
for her preferred production plan, because participation with voting against one’s preference
is dominated.





i=1 θi = 1
	
denote the
set of shareholders supporting the eﬃcient production plan by H (θ) = {i ∈ H |θi < γ} and
the set of supporters of monopolistic output by L(θ) = L ∪ {i ∈ H |θi > γ} (see Proposi-
tion 1). High-valuation shareholders i ∈ H with θi = γ are indiﬀerent with respect to the
ﬁrm’s production plan and, therefore, will never participate in the assembly. Henceforth,
shareholders i ∈ L(θ) will be referred to as ﬁnancial owners, because their incentives are
dominated by the proﬁt motive. Shareholders i ∈ H (θ) will be called stakeholders, because
their incentives are predominantly governed by the externality. Note that the distribu-
tion between stakeholders and ﬁnancial owners is endogenous. The following ‘dominant
shareholder theorem’ characterizes the pure strategy equilibria of the voting game.
Proposition 2 For suﬃciently small participation costs there exists a pure strategy equi-
librium in the voting game if and only if one of the following three conditions holds:
(a) there is i ∈ H (θ) such that θi > θj for all j ∈ L(θ), in which case y = n is adopted
with certainty;






j∈L(θ) θj, in which case a coin toss determines the production plan.4
Proof:See Appendix.
This result states that, except for a knife-edge case, control of the company rests with a
dominant shareholder, who owns strictly more shares than any one of the shareholders from
the opponent faction does. (The dominant shareholder need not be the largest shareholder,
though, provided the latter belongs to the same faction.)
This result is, in fact, quite typical for models of strategic shareholder voting with small
participation costs. Even though the tie-breaking rule may make a diﬀerence with respect to
pure strategy equilibria, the fact that the dominant shareholder fully controls the company
is robust. Ritzberger (2005) considers a similar model, but with a “status-quo” that always
wins at ties. In that case pure strategy equilibria take a dominant shareholder, who opposes
the status-quo. Dorofeenko et al. (2005, Proposition 1) assume that one supporter of the
3 The coin does not have to be fair. All that is important is that the probability of each of the two
outcomes is bounded away from zero.
4 If preferences were truly lexicographic, the pure equilibria described in (a)-(c) would be the only
equilibria. For, at a mixed equilibrium at least one agent will be indiﬀerent between participating and
abstaining. But if her probability of being pivotal were zero, she would prefer to abstain; if it were positive,
she would prefer to participate—a contradiction.
8status-quo (the “president”) is committed to participate in the assembly. Still, however,
pure strategy equilibria feature a dominant shareholder, who controls the company.
If none of the three conditions from Proposition 2 is met, only mixed equilibria exist for





i∈L(θ) θi. There may be more than one mixed equilibrium, though,
in this case. Any equilibrium of the overall model will, however, involve a selection5 of
precisely one mixed equilibrium when the conditions from Proposition 2 fail.
To obtain well-deﬁned payoﬀs for the stock market, we, therefore, ﬁx one such selection
throughout. This ﬁxed selection is assumed to be such that it always selects a pure strategy
equilibrium, whenever there exists one. (Note that it may be impossible to choose a continu-
ous such selection.) Formally, the ﬁxed selection is summarized by a function Λ : Θ → [0,1].
This function Λ is eﬀectively the composition of the selection from the equilibrium corre-
spondence, that maps share distributions θ ∈ Θ into participation probabilities with the
function that takes participation probabilities into the probability λ = Λ(θ) ∈ [0,1] that
the assembly adopts the monopolistic production plan y = m. According to the assumption
on the selection, condition (a) from Proposition 2 implies Λ(θ) = 0, condition (b) implies
Λ(θ) = 1, and condition (c) implies 0 < Λ(θ) < 1.
3.2 Take-over Constraints
The function Λ captures the outcome of shareholder voting as far as production plans are
concerned. At the same time it pins down what is required to alter the production plan by
shifts in the share distribution.
In particular, if initially Λ(θ) = 1, then Proposition 2 implies that maxj∈L(θ) θj > θi for
all i ∈ H (θ). A stock market trade from θ to a new share allocation θ0 yields a change in
the production plan, that is, Λ(θ0) < 1, if and only if maxi∈H(θ0) θ0
i ≥ θ0
j for all j ∈ L(θ0)
holds after trade. Likewise, a trade from a share distribution θ with Λ(θ) = 0 to a new
allocation θ0 induces a change in the production plan if and only if maxi∈L(θ0) θ0
i ≥ θ0
j for all
j ∈ H (θ0) holds after trade.
The same reasoning applies, of course, when initially (at θ) 0 < Λ(θ) < 1 holds. In
this case Λ(θ0) = 1 (resp. Λ(θ0) = 0) obtains after trade if and only if maxj∈L(θ0) θ0
j > θ0
i
for all i ∈ H (θ0) (resp. maxi∈H(θ0) θ0
i > θ0
j for all j ∈ L(θ0)). In other words, a change (in
the probabilities) of the production plan(s) by trading from θ to θ0 requires that after trade
(at θ0) a diﬀerent type than before trade (at θ) is (one of) the dominant shareholder(s).
Otherwise the dominant shareholder would still be of the same type as before trade, which
would imply no change in the production plan.
As for notation, let the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm, given a probability λ ∈ [0,1] of the
monopolistic production plan, be deﬁned by π (λ) = λπ +(1 − λ)π. Substituting λ = Λ(θ)
to obtain π (Λ(θ)) gives the proﬁt that agents expect to earn at the share distribution θ ∈ Θ
from their equity participation.
5 A selection from a correspondence F : Θ → [0,1]
n is any function f : Θ → [0,1]
n such that f (θ) ∈ F (θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ.
94 The Stock Market
The shareholdings that are relevant for the vote on the production plan are those that
result from trade at the stock market prior to the shareholder assembly. Modelling the
stock market is a nontrivial exercise, though, because share trades imply possibly diﬀerent
outcomes (λ’s) in shareholder voting. Trading at the stock market is, therefore, genuinely
strategic. In particular, unless no change of λ is implied by stock market activity, how a
given net trade is evaluated by an agent depends on what other agents trade. More precisely,
it depends on whether or not an agent’s net trade is pivotal or not for a target change in
the probability λ of the monopolistic production plan.
At a share distribution θ ∈ Θ with an implied probability λ = Λ(θ) of monopolistic
output shareholder i‘s expected utility is
ui (θi,λ) ≡ ωi + θiπ (λ) + (1 − λ)max{0,vi − v}
where the endowment ωi may include revenue or expenditure from share sales or purchases
that took investor i from initial share holdings to θi. Accordingly, the utility diﬀerence
resulting from a trade from θi to θ0
i, which implies a change in the probability of monopolistic


































where ∆ = π − π > 0. Consequently, i ∈ I prefers share θ0
i purchased (sold) at price q












































[q − π (λi)] (9)















, but i refuses to trade—assuming that this is feasible. If
i is pivotal, in the sense that the change from λ to λ0 fails, if she refuses to trade, then
λi = λ. If it succeeds irrespective of whether or not i trades, then λi = λ0. Consequently, at
λ0 = λi shareholder i will want to buy (resp. sell) an arbitrary amount of shares whenever
q < π (λ) = π (λ0) (resp. q > π (λ) = π (λ0)), and at q = π (λ) = π (λ0) she is indiﬀerent.
To model the full complexity of stock market trades as a non-cooperative game seems
intractable. Therefore, we limit the present analysis to a criterion that identiﬁes when a
given share distribution θ ∈ Θ will not be changed by stock market activity aimed at buying
control over the ﬁrm.
Methodologically this bears some resemblance to solution concepts for games, as it
declares something—in this case some share distribution θ ∈ Θ—a “solution” if it is immune
10against a certain class of “deviations”—in this case stock market trades. But it is not a
non-cooperative solution for a game, since it remains silent on the “oﬀ equilibrium” moves
that bring about the equilibrium distribution. (Technically, there is no game form that
underlies this “solution.”) It is more like looking for a point, where a long process of trades
will come to a halt in the sense that no further trades for control purposes will occur.
Two such criteria will be studied. For both the object is a share distribution θ ∈ Θ,
and for both the class of allowed “deviations” will be stock market (net) trades at a single
price. The two criteria diﬀer with respect to how trades are initiated. The ﬁrst criterion
will consider tender oﬀers that are unilaterally proposed by an agent. The second criterion
will allow for coordinated trades that are initiated by a benevolent “auctioneer” or “market
maker.”
4.1 Tender Oﬀers
Tender oﬀers are taken to be oﬀers by an agent to buy a speciﬁed quantity of shares at a
speciﬁed price with the goal to alter the chances of the ﬁrm’s production plans in shareholder
voting. For an initial share distribution θ ∈ Θ to qualify as an “equilibrium” distribution
it is necessary that no agent can make a tender oﬀer which is successful in the sense that
other agents will voluntarily supply the shares required for the oﬀer to succeed.
Because eﬀective net trades have to be feasible, the following deﬁnition of a rationing







i=1 ξi ≤ 0
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as the net supply







i=1 ξi = 0
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that precisely meet x. A (supply side) rationing rule is a function rx : Ωx → ∂Ωx such that
ξ ≤ rx (ξ) for all ξ ∈ Ωx.6 Denote by R(x) the set of all such rationing rules rx for a given
x > 0.
Deﬁnition 1 A tender oﬀer by i ∈ I is a pair (q,xi) ∈ R2
++ consisting of a bid price
q > 0 and a quantity xi > 0 of shares demanded by i.
The game induced by a tender oﬀer (q,xi) by i at the share distribution θ ∈ Θ is the
n-player normal form game Γθ (q,xi) = (S,υ), where S = ×n
j=1Sj with Sj = [−θj,0] for all
j 6= i and Si = R(xi), and υ = (υ1,...,υn) : S → Rn is given by
υj (s) = (θj + rj (s−i))π (Λ(θ + r(s−i)))
+[1 − Λ(θ + r(s−i))]max{0,vj − v} − qrj (s−i)
(10)
for all s ∈ S and all j ∈ I, where r−i = si ∈ R(xi) = Si and ri (s−i) = xi if xi+
P
j6=i sj ≤ 0
(that is, if s−i ∈ Ωxi) and r(s−i) = 0 ∈ Rn if xi +
P
j6=i sj > 0 (that is, if s−i / ∈ Ωxi),
s−i = (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sn), and r−i (·) = (r1 (·),...,ri−1 (·),ri+1 (·),...,rn (·)).
That the agent, who made the oﬀer, can choose a rationing rule in the game induced
by the tender oﬀer expresses her discretion to trade with whom she wishes. Even though
regulation in many countries requires the bidder to oﬀer the same price to all potential
6 Notation for vector inequalities is standard: x ≥ y means xi ≥ yi for all i, x > y means x ≥ y but not
x = y, and x  y means xi > yi for all i.
11sellers, it cannot rule out this discretion. That strategy sets of suppliers are bounded (by
−θi) from below excludes short sales. After all, negative shares would have no meaning in
a shareholder assembly, nor would shares above 1. A tender oﬀer (q,xi) that is not met by
suﬃcient supply, that is, xi +
P
j6=i sj > 0, fails and all trades are cancelled.
Deﬁnition 2 A tender oﬀer (q,xi) by i ∈ I is successful at θ ∈ Θ if the game Γθ (q,xi)
induced by it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium sθ ∈ S such that xi +
P
j6=i sθ
j ≤ 0 and










For a tender oﬀer to be successful it takes an equilibrium in the game induced by it at
which the demand is fulﬁlled. But the equilibrium needs to be nontrivial in the sense that
at least one player has a strict incentive to play the equilibrium. This condition excludes
trades at indiﬀerence. It also excludes oﬀers that amount to a reshuﬄing of shares, say,
between agents of the same type, without altering (the probabilities of) the production
plan(s).
Since Grossman and Hart (1980) it has become customary to assume that traders, who
are not pivotal to a trade, will not tender unless they are oﬀered more than the after-trade
value of the ﬁrm: the “atomistic shareholder model.” This is what the deﬁnition of a
successful tender oﬀer captures.7 If no trader is pivotal, then sellers will demand a price of
at least the after-trade value of the ﬁrm. But the bidder, who wishes to buy, will optimally
only make an oﬀer with a price not exceeding the after-trade value of the ﬁrm. Therefore,
when no agent is pivotal, by (7) no trader has a strict incentive to trade—thus excluding
this as a successful tender oﬀer.
Likewise, a trade between agents of the same type that implies no change of the prob-
ability Λ(θ) does not qualify as a successful tender oﬀer. In fact, a successful tender oﬀer












. For, suppose that equality would hold.
Then by the argument above trade can only take place at q = π (Λ(θ)). But, under the







, (7) implies that all players are indiﬀerent among
all their strategies in Γθ (π (Λ(θ)),xi).
The following is the ﬁrst equilibrium criterion that requires a share distribution which
is not vulnerable to successful tender oﬀers.
Deﬁnition 3 A share distribution θ ∈ Θ is uncontestable if there exists no successful
tender oﬀer at θ. It supports the eﬃcient (resp. monopolistic) production plan if Λ(θ) = 0
(resp. Λ(θ) = 1).
Uncontestability demands that the share allocation will not change due to any tender
oﬀer by a bidder, who attempts to take over in order to alter the production plan. In this
sense an uncontestable share distribution is stable and constitutes an equilibrium notion.
A share distribution that is not uncontestable is called contestable.
7 Note, however, that Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) have shown that the argument by Grossman and Hart
(1980) does not survive in a fully speciﬁed game model.
124.1.1 Existence
To prove logical consistency of uncontestability, the ﬁrst result characterizes when a share
allocation that supports eﬃciency is contestable, under the hypothesis that all ﬁnancial
owners together own no more shares than the dominant stakeholder.
Proposition 3 A share distribution θ ∈ Θ with Λ(θ) = 0 and
P
i∈L(θ) θi ≤ maxi∈H(θ) θi is
contestable if and only if maxi∈L θi + maxi∈H(θ) θi > γ.
Proof:See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When the characterizing condition is
met, the largest ﬁnancial owner can “bribe” the currently dominant high-valuation type
by oﬀering a premium over the after-trade value of the ﬁrm that compensates the high-
valuation seller for the lost utility from the externality. This premium is aﬀordable for the
low-valuation bidder, because by 1/m ≤ γ < 1 (as implied by the characterizing condition)
there remain enough high-valuation types that can be exploited after the take-over.
An important consequence of Proposition 3 is an existence result for uncontestable share
distributions. For, let θ∗ ∈ Θ be given by θ∗
i = 1/m ≤ γ for all i ∈ H and θ∗
i = 0 for all
i ∈ L. Then H (θ∗) = H, L(θ∗) = L, and maxi∈L θ∗
i + maxi∈H θ∗
i = 1/m ≤ γ. Therefore,
the “only if”-part of Proposition 3 implies that θ∗ is uncontestable.
Corollary 1 There exists an uncontestable share distribution θ∗ ∈ Θ and it supports the
eﬃcient production plan, Λ(θ∗) = 0.
Intuitively, this result states that shares suﬃciently dispersed among high-valuation
types, and small enough stakes among low-valuation types, will guarantee uncontestability
of the eﬃcient production plan. In this sense competitive behavior goes along with dispersed
ownership in the ﬁrm.
While Corollary 1 establishes existence, uniqueness remains open even with respect to
the production plan supported by an uncontestable share distribution. This is to be studied
next.
4.1.2 Multiplicity
Proposition 3 relies on the hypothesis that all ﬁnancial owners together do not own more
shares than the largest stakeholder. If they did, the eﬃcient production plan would be
contestable. This is so, because in that case the largest low-valuation type could buy all
the shares held by ﬁnancial owners and take over. This “pooling” of shares beneﬁts all
ﬁnancial owners, as it achieves their preferred production plan, so that they do not even
require a control premium in order to sell. Therefore, any share distribution that supports
eﬃciency must be such that all ﬁnancial owners together own no more than the dominant
stakeholder.
Proposition 4 Any share distribution θ ∈ Θ with Λ(θ) = 0 and
P
i∈L(θ) θi > maxi∈H(θ) θi
is contestable.
13Proof:See Appendix.
Intuitively, when all ﬁnancial owners together own more than the largest stakeholder,
they have an incentive to “pool” their shares to increase the chances of monopolistic output
in shareholder voting. This does not involve a control premium, that is, the bid price
does not exceed the after-trade value of the ﬁrm. This is so, because ﬁnancial owners only
tender an amount just enough to take over and beneﬁt through their retained shares from
the increased after-trade value of the ﬁrm. Take-overs by ﬁnancial owners, therefore, involve
a concentration of ownership.
That the eﬃcient production plan is contestable does not necessarily imply, though,
that the monopolistic production plan is uncontestable. But it may be for a particular
parameter range.
To establish the possibility of multiple uncontestable share distributions, ﬁrst observe
that by Proposition 4 what counts for contestability of eﬃcient output is the sum of shares
held by ﬁnancial owners. If this sum is large enough, they can pool suﬃciently many
shares in the hands of one ﬁnancial owner to take over. If the resulting block of shares
is big enough, it may be immune to counter-attacks, provided the externality is not too
important as compared to the proﬁt increment ∆ (that is, γ is not too large). This is what
the next result captures.
Proposition 5 If γ < 1/2, any share distribution θ ∈ Θ with maxk∈L(θ) θk+minj∈H(θ) θj >
2γ is uncontestable and supports the monopolistic production plan, Λ(θ) = 1.
Proof:See Appendix.
Let k ∈ L(θ) be such that θk > 2γ −minj∈H(θ) θj. Then θj < γ for all j ∈ H (θ) implies
by Proposition 2(b) that Λ(θ) = 1, as θk > γ > θj for all j ∈ H (θ). Suppose that i ∈ H (θ)
can make a tender oﬀer (q,xi) such that after trade a probability λ0 < 1 of monopolistic
output obtains, if the oﬀer is successful.
That λ0 < 1 implies that θi+xi ≤ γ, because otherwise i would also prefer monopolistic
output by Proposition 1. If the oﬀer is successful, then λ0 < 1 also implies θi +xi = θ0
i ≥ θ0
k
by Proposition 2(b) and the choice of the selection. Combining these two inequalities
yields θ0
k ≤ γ. Since xi ≥ θk − θ0
k, it follows that xi ≥ θk − γ. But then θi + xi ≥
θi + θk − γ > θi + γ − minj∈H(θ) θj (where the last inequality follows from the hypothesis)
implies θi + xi = θ0
i > γ, a contradiction.
End of Proof.
The intuition for this result is based on preference reversal. A stakeholder, who attempts
to buy control, must after trade own more shares than the originally dominant ﬁnancial
owner. But when the latter controls as much as she does according to the hypothesis of
Proposition 5, this is impossible. For, by purchasing such a big quantity the buyer changes
her preferences so as to also prefer monopolistic output. (That such a preference reversal
can occur requires γ < 1/2.)
The high share of the dominant ﬁnancial owner shareholder constitutes a “barrier”
against tender oﬀers by stakeholder. Therefore, monopolistic behavior is associated with
concentrated ownership in the ﬁrm. A partial converse is that perfectly concentrated own-
ership implies monopolistic behavior, even if γ exceeds 1/2, but not 1.
14Corollary 2 If γ < 1, then any share distribution θ ∈ Θ, where one agents owns all
shares, θi = 1 for some i ∈ I, is uncontestable and supports the monopolistic production
plan, Λ(θ) = 1.
Proof:See Appendix.
If γ < 1/2, then θi = 1 implies that i ∈ L(θ), irrespective of whether or not i ∈ L. The
desired result then follows from Proposition 5.
If 1/2 ≤ γ < 1, again θi = 1 implies that i ∈ L(θ). Suppose some j ∈ H = H (θ)
can make a tender oﬀer (q,xj) such that after trade λ0 < 1 obtains. By hypothesis j
can only buy from i ∈ L(θ). Therefore, (8) implies ∆γ ≥ xj (q − π (λ0)) for j ∈ H and
∆ ≤ xj (q − π (λ0)) for i ∈ L(θ), because θ0
i = 1 − xj. But these two inequalities combine
to the contradiction ∆γ ≥ ∆ ⇒ γ ≥ 1. End of Proof.
This result is like a mirror image of Corollary 1, where a dispersed ownership structure
supports the eﬃcient production plan. Here, one agent owning all shares supports the
monopolistic production plan.
For completeness it needs to be said, however, that an uncontestable share distribution
with full concentration of ownership may also support the eﬃcient production plan. This will
be the case, when the externality is suﬃciently important compared to the proﬁt increment
∆, that is, when v − v > ∆ = π − π > 0.
Corollary 3 If γ > 1, any share distribution θ ∈ Θ with θi = 1 for some i ∈ H is
uncontestable.
Proof:See Appendix.
Let i ∈ H be such that θi = 1, so that Λ(θ) = 0 by Proposition 2(a). If a low-valuation
type j ∈ L were to stage a tender oﬀer, she would have to buy from i. Thus, (8) implies
0 ≥ xj (q − π (λ0)) for j ∈ L, where λ0 > 0 if the oﬀer succeeds. Therefore, q ≤ π (λ0). On
the other hand, (8) for i ∈ H implies λ0∆(γ − 1) ≤ xj (q − π (λ0)), because θ0
i = 1−xj. But
the last inequality combined with q ≤ π (λ0) and λ0 > 0 implies the contradiction γ ≤ 1.End
of Proof.
As Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 show, when γ is not too large, control by ﬁnancial
owners is robust against take-over attempts under concentrated ownership. For, if stake-
holders attempt a take-over, they reverse their preferences, when they hold such high shares
in the company. This can only change when takeover attempts by high-valuation types are
coordinated so that each of them buys only very little, but collectively they buy enough
to unseat the controlling ﬁnancial owner. This observation motivates the next, stronger
criterion.
4.2 Coordinated Action
The scope of the uncontestability criterion is limited to decentralized trading, where one
agent takes the initiative and makes a tender oﬀer. More coordination is conceivable,
though. As an extreme case imagine an auctioneer or a market-maker, who suggests net
15trades to agents until all gains from trade are exhausted. This can potentially overcome the
coordination problem of stakeholders in trading towards a share distribution that supports
the eﬃcient production plan.
Deﬁnition 4 An oﬀer at θ ∈ Θ is a pair (q,x) consisting of a share price q > 0 and a
net trade vector x ∈ Rn such that θ + x ∈ Θ.
The game induced by an oﬀer (q,x) at θ is the n-player normal form game ˆ Γθ (q,x) = 
ˆ S, ˆ υ

, where ˆ S = ×i∈I ˆ Si, ˆ Si = {min{0,xi},max{0,xi}} for all i ∈ I, and ˆ υ = (ˆ υ1,..., ˆ υn) :
ˆ S → Rn with
ˆ υi (s) = φi (s)π (Λ(φ(s))) − q (φi (s) − θi)
+[1 − Λ(φ(s))]max{0,vi − v}
(11)
for all s ∈ S and all i ∈ I, where φ(x) = θ + x ∈ Θ and φ(s) = θ ∈ Θ for s 6= x.
The deﬁnition of an oﬀer at θ allows for the trivial case x = 0 ∈ Rn for generality.
It will soon be shown that this does not do any harm. Short sales are excluded, though,
as θ + x ≥ 0. Another restriction incorporated in the deﬁnition of an oﬀer is that all
investors trade at the same price q. And their market operations are coordinated, that is,
the structure of trades is not decided individually, but elicited by the auctioneer.
Intuitively, an oﬀer is a trade proposal to the agents that each one, who is aﬀected
(xi 6= 0), can either accept (si = xi) or reject (si = 0). If all accept, it is implemented,
otherwise there is no trade. Clearly, this is a stylized way to represent a stock market as
it requires consensus among aﬀected agents. But, because all possible oﬀers are considered
and they cannot be inﬂuenced by the agents, it captures the best that a centralized market
can achieve. In this sense such centralized oﬀers constitute an interesting benchmark case.
If trade were allowed when some, but not all aﬀected agents accept, markets would not
clear and quantity rationing would be required. Yet, if an oﬀer is accepted by some aﬀected
agents, but not by others, and the trades among the accepting agents are consistent with
market clearing (possibly after some rationing), then there is an alternative oﬀer that is
accepted by all aﬀected agents. In this sense there is no loss of generality involved with this
mechanism, save for the implicit coordination.
Deﬁnition 5 A control trade at θ ∈ Θ is an oﬀer (q,x) such that, in the game ˆ Γθ (q,x)
induced by the oﬀer (q,x), the strategy proﬁle s = x ∈ ˆ S constitutes a Nash equilibrium,
where at least one aﬀected agent i is strictly better oﬀ with trading than without, that is,
ˆ υi (x) > ˆ υi (x−i,0).
A control trade is an oﬀer that is successful in equilibrium. But again it is so in a
nontrivial way. The condition that at least one player has a strict incentive to play the
equilibrium excludes trades at indiﬀerence. In particular, it excludes trivial oﬀers with
x = 0 ∈ Rn. The following is the stronger equilibrium criterion that is used to analyze
coordinated market interaction.
Deﬁnition 6 A share distribution θ ∈ Θ is universally uncontestable if there exists no
control trade at θ.
16The same share distribution as in Corollary 1 establishes existence of universally uncon-
testable share distributions. But, because the criterion is stronger than uncontestability, the
production plan supported by a universally uncontestable share distribution is now unique:
It is the eﬃcient production plan.
Proposition 6 There exists a universally uncontestable share distribution θ∗ ∈ Θ, and
every universally uncontestable share distribution supports the eﬃcient production plan.
Proof:See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. By quasi-linear preferences this is a transfer-
able utility model. Therefore, appropriate transfers among the agents can always achieve
eﬃciency. Since there are only two types, the market maker can ﬁnd such a transfer scheme
that is equivalent to net trades at a single price. This is, in particular, the logic underlying
uniqueness of the supported production plan (part (b) of the proof).
This argument reveals that, unlike Corollary 1, the conclusion from Proposition 6 may be
peculiar to the present model. While existence of an uncontestable share distribution that
supports eﬃcient production appears to hold quite generally, that only eﬃcient production
plans are supported by (universally) uncontestable share distributions depends crucially
on a transferable utility framework—and, of course, on the presence of a coordinating
auctioneer. Nevertheless, the power of universal uncontestability in a transferable utility
model can serve as a useful benchmark for more general models of corporate control and
stock market trade.
5 Conclusions
The present paper studies the interaction between two core institutions of industrial democ-
racy: shareholder voting and stock market trade. In the model, economic agents can trade
voting stock before the ﬁrm’s production plan is decided by a vote among shareholders (un-
der the one-share-one-vote rule). Even though this leads to a highly strategic interaction
at the stock market, we identify surprising support for competitive behavior and eﬃciency.
A share distribution is uncontestable if it cannot be changed by a unilateral tender
oﬀer—an equilibrium criterion about share allocations. It is shown that there always ex-
ists an uncontestable share distribution that supports the eﬃcient production plan. If the
equilibrium criterion is extended so as to exclude all possible multilateral control trades
(“universally uncontestable”), then only eﬃciency can be supported. Though this con-
clusion depends on the transferable utility framework employed here, it shows that share
trading prior to decisions within the ﬁrm tends to push the allocation closer to where gains
from trade are exhausted. And when gains from trade are exhausted, eﬃciency obtains.
Without the coordination implicit in universal uncontestability the picture is a bit more
ambiguous. Even though there is always an uncontestable share distribution that supports
the eﬃcient production plan, the latter appears fragile. This is because the types sup-
porting eﬃciency are endangered by preference reversal when their stakes in the company
become too high. Therefore, supporting eﬃciency takes dispersed shares. But dispersed
17distributions are vulnerable to “bribing” some supporters of eﬃcient production on account
of exploiting the rest.
This opens the possibility of uncontestable distributions that support monopolistic be-
havior, that is, multiplicity of uncontestable share distributions. If shares are suﬃciently
concentrated in the hands of a type, who supports monopolistic behavior, such a distribu-
tion may be uncontestable. This is because a takeover attempt by a supporter of eﬃcient
production may be thwarted by preference reversal, as she needs to accumulate too many
shares.
These observations combine to testable implications of the theory. According to the
present model, competitive behavior (the eﬃcient production plan) should be associated
with dispersed share ownership. Reciprocally, concentrated ownership tends to come with
monopolistic behavior. An empirical investigation of these relations is a topic for further
research.
In terms of policy implications the results are encouraging for shareholder activism.
As the model illustrates, a tighter grip of shareholders on their company can reduce the
monopoly distortion. Voting trusts among supporters of the eﬃcient production plan, for
instance, could help maintaining dispersed ownership, without leaving control to supporters
of monopolistic output. Thus, the present model could be used to provide a rationale for
syndication.
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21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. A shareholder with low valuation vi = v (weakly) prefers the
high price p = v (y = m) to the low price p = v (y = n) if and only if
θi [v − c]m ≥ θi [v − c]n ⇔ π ≥ π
that is, if and only if the maximum proﬁt at the high price is at least as large as the
maximum proﬁt at the low price. Such a shareholder prefers the high price (y = m) to a
zero price (y = n + 1) if and only if
θi [v − c]m ≥ v − θic(n + 1) ⇔ θi ≥
v
π + c(n + 1)
=
v
vm + c(n − m + 1)
≡ α
that is, if and only if her share is larger than a threshold α. Finally, the low price p = v
(y = n) is preferred by such a shareholder to a zero price (y = n + 1) if and only if
θi [v − c]n ≥ v − θic(n + 1) ⇔ θi ≥
v





Note that β < 1/n and β > α if and only if π > π.
That is, low-valuation types with shares below min{α,β} favor a zero price (y = n+1).
With shares above this threshold they favor the high (resp. low) price if π > π (resp. π ≤ π).
In other words, low-valuation types with suﬃciently many shares (θi ≥ min{α,β}) favor
the alternative that yields higher proﬁts.
A shareholders with high valuation vi = v prefers a low price p = v (y = n) to a high
price p = v (y = m) if and only if




provided π > π. (Under this condition the threshold γ satisﬁes γ ≥ 1/m, because it is
strictly decreasing in c and c ≤ v.) If π ≤ π, then she always prefers the low price p = v
(y = n) to the high price p = v (y = m). She prefers a low price p = v (y = n) to a zero
price (y = n + 1) if and only if
θi [v − c]n + v − v ≥ v − θicn ⇔ θi ≥
v
π + c(n + 1)
= β
that is, if her share is above the threshold β. Finally, she prefers a high price p = v (y = m)
to a zero price (y = n + 1) if and only if
θi [v − c]m ≥ v − θicn ⇔ θi ≥
v
π + c(n + 1)
≡ η
i.e., if her share is at least as large as a threshold η. Note that n > m and v > c imply
β < η. Moreover, because v > c, the inequality η < γ holds if and only if π > π.
22That is, high-valuation types with shares below β favor a zero price. With shares
between β and η they favor a low price. If π ≤ π, high-valuation types with shares above η
continue to favor a low price, because in this case the threshold γ is negative, γ < 0 < η. If
π > π, then η < γ, but high-valuation types with shares between η and γ still favor a low
price. With shares above γ and π > π they prefer a high price.
The thresholds are ordered as follows: 1/m > η > max{α,β}, and π > π if and only if
α < β and η < γ.End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. “if:” Let σi ∈ {0,1} denote the participation probability of
shareholder i ∈ I. Assume condition (a) and let σi = 1 for the shareholder i ∈ H (θ), who
controls more votes than any j ∈ L(θ), and σk = 0 for all other shareholders k 6= i. Then
no shareholder k other than i has an incentive to participate. For, k ∈ L(θ) cannot change
the outcome (as θk < θi) but would have to bear participation costs; and k ∈ H (θ) already
gets her preferred outcome without spending participation costs. Finally, if i ∈ H (θ) were
to withdraw, y = m would be adopted with positive probability (by a coin toss). Thus
a pure Nash equilibrium has been constructed in which y = n is adopted with certainty.
An analogous argument, with H (θ) and L(θ) interchanged, establishes the “if”-part under
condition (b).
Finally, assume condition (c) and let σj = 1 for all j ∈ H (θ)∪L(θ). Under this strategy
combination both alternatives are adopted with positive probability (by a coin toss). If any
participating shareholder would deviate, the preferred alternative of the opponent faction
would be adopted with certainty. Hence, this is a Nash equilibrium.





then σi = 1 for all i ∈ H (θ) ∪ L(θ), because otherwise at least one i ∈ H (θ) ∪ L(θ) could














i∈L(θ) σiθi. In the
ﬁrst case equilibrium implies that σj = 0 for all j ∈ L(θ) and that y = n is adopted
with certainty. If there were more than one i ∈ H (θ) with σi = 1, then one of them
could withdraw without changing the outcome (as σj = 0 for all j ∈ L(θ)), but saving
participation costs. Thus, by the equilibrium hypothesis there is precisely one i ∈ H (θ)
such that σi = 1. If there were j ∈ L(θ) with θj ≥ θi, then j ∈ L(θ) would have an
incentive to participate (as the probability of y = m would jump from zero to a positive
value), in contradiction to the equilibrium assumption. Therefore, θi > θj for all j ∈ L(θ)
which establishes (a). An analogous argument for the second case, where
P
i∈H(θ) σiθi < P
i∈L(θ) σiθi, establishes (b) and completes the proof of the “only if”-part.
End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. “if:” That λ = Λ(θ) = 0 implies by Proposition 2(a) that
γ > maxi∈H(θ) θi > θj for all j ∈ L(θ). Let k ∈ argmaxi∈H(θ) θi, j ∈ argmaxi∈L θi, and
λ0 = Λ(θ0), where θ0 ∈ Θ satisﬁes θ0
j = θj + θk, θk = 0, and θ0
i = θi for all i ∈ I \ {j,k}.
Since θk ≥ θi for all i ∈ H (θ) and θj > 0 by the hypothesis, Proposition 2(b) implies, by
23θ0
j > θ0
i for all i ∈ H (θ), that λ0 = 1. Consider an oﬀer by j ∈ L to buy xj = θk at a price







(the latter, because k ∈ H (θ) implies θk < γ). Even though this involves a control premium,
it is proﬁtable for j ∈ L, because by (7) and the hypothesis
∆(θj + xj) − xj (q − π) = ∆[θj + θk − γ] > 0
The oﬀer is also aﬀordable for j ∈ L, because qxj = θkπ + (v − v), so that from (6) in the
case y = m and vj = v
qxj = θkπ + (v − v) ≤ ω0 + (θj + θk)π ⇔
v − v ≤ ω0 + θjπ + θk∆







(q − π) = ∆[γ − γ] = 0
No i ∈ H (θ) with 0 < θi < θk is willing to sell, though, because by (7) and xi ≥ −θi

















< ∆(θi − θk) < 0
High-valuation types i ∈ H (θ) with θi = θk are indiﬀerent to trade, so it is optimal for
them not to tender. All i ∈ L(θ) \ {j} are willing to sell, because q > π (λ0), irrespective
of whether or not they are pivotal. But even if they all sell, they cannot fulﬁll j’s demand,




i∈L(θ)\{j} θi, so their combined
supply falls short of k’s demand. Therefore, they must be rationed in equilibrium: If not,
k ∈ H (θ) would still be pivotal, but could only sell less than θk; selling less than θk at q
would not be proﬁtable for k ∈ H (θ), though. Hence, in equilibrium j ∈ L decides to ration
other low valuation types, but not k ∈ H (θ).
“only if:” If at λ = Λ(θ) = 0 there is a successful tender oﬀer at price q by, say, j ∈ L,














By the hypothesis that
P
i∈L(θ) θi ≤ maxi∈H(θ) θi success (λ0 > 0) implies that at least one
i ∈ H (θ) must tender some of her shares, that is, there is i ∈ H (θ) with xi < 0 such that













24which implies (γ − θi)/(−xi) ≤ θj/xj, as λ0 > 0 and ∆ > 0. Since either for i ∈ H (θ) or
for j ∈ L strict inequality must hold at a successful oﬀer, it follows from xj > 0 and xi < 0
that xj (γ − θi)+xiθj < 0. Since xj ≥ −xi must hold, θj ≥ 0 and xj > 0 imply θi +θj > γ.
Therefore, maxi∈L θi + maxi∈H(θ) θi > γ as required.
End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. If Λ(θ) = 0, then by Proposition 2(a) there is some i ∈ H (θ)
such that θi > θj for all j ∈ L(θ). Fix k ∈ argmaxi∈L θi and a positive number δ < P
j∈L(θ) θj − maxi∈H(θ) θi (which exists by hypothesis). Consider a tender oﬀer (q,xk) by
k ∈ L to buy quantity xk = maxi∈H(θ) θi − θk + δ at a bid price q that is chosen as follows:








j∈L(θ) θj − maxi∈H(θ) θi − δ
(12)
then q = π; ﬁnally, if H ∩ L(θ) 6= ∅ and the inequality in (12) is reversed (<), then
q = π +

1 −







(The reverse inequality to (12) implies that the term in brackets in (13) is strictly smaller
than 1, hence, q < π.) If this oﬀer succeeds, then k ∈ L(θ) will hold more shares than any
stakeholder, so that λ0 = 1 will obtain after trade, with π (λ0) = π > q. The latter implies
that the oﬀer is aﬀordable for k according to (6), because the price involves no control
premium.
To see that the oﬀer succeeds, consider the following net trades in response to the tender
oﬀer (q,xk): Stakeholders do not sell at all, i.e. θ0
i = θi for all i ∈ H (θ), and all ﬁnancial
owners (except k) sell precisely
θ0
i − θi = xi =
−xkθi P
j∈L(θ)\{k} θj
for all i ∈ L(θ) \ {k}. Since
P
i∈L(θ)\{k} xi = −xk, each i ∈ L(θ) \ {k} with θi > 0 is
pivotal for the tender oﬀer to succeed. This implies that if ﬁnancial owners are better oﬀ
with selling, then each of them will sell precisely xi. For, tendering less than −xi cannot be
optimal, because then the oﬀer fails and q > π = π (λ). Tendering more cannot be optimal
either, because it leaves λ0 = 1 unchanged by rationing, and selling one extra share earns
q, but costs π, which is more than q. Therefore, each i ∈ L \ {k} sells precisely xi.




∆ = π +
θk
xk
∆ > q ⇒ (θk + xk)∆ > xk (q − π)
where the latter is the proﬁtability condition (9) with λ0 = 1, λk = λ = 0, and vk = v.
25Likewise, any i ∈ L with θi > 0 gains by selling, as
θi + xi = θi
P




⇒ (θi + xi)∆ > 0 ≥ xi (q − π)
where the latter is again (9) for λ0 = 1, λi = λ = 0 (because i is pivotal), and vi = v. If
L(θ) = L, this completes the proof that all active traders gain.
If H ∩ L(θ) 6= ∅, consider ﬁrst the case, where (12) holds, so that q = π. With
l ∈ argmini∈H∩L(θ) θi condition (12) is equivalent to θl + xl ≥ γ, hence, θi + xi ≥ γ for all
i ∈ H ∩ L(θ). Therefore, the appropriate version of (9) for i ∈ H ∩ L(θ) is
∆(θi + xi − γ) ≥ 0 = xi (q − π)
(because i is pivotal) showing that it is optimal for i ∈ H ∩L(θ) to sell. If the inequality in
(12) is reversed, then q is given by (13), thus, π < q < π. Denoting again θl = mini∈H∩L(θ) θi
the inequality θi ≥ θl for all i ∈ H ∩ L(θ) is equivalent to
π +
θi + xi − γ
xi










which for xi < 0 is in turn equivalent to ∆(θi + xi − γ) ≥ xi (q − π), which is the appropri-
ate version of (9) for λ0 = 1, λi = λ = 0 (because i is pivotal), and vi = v. By the previous
argument tendering more or less than −xi is suboptimal, so each i ∈ H ∩ L(θ) also sells
precisely xi.
No stakeholder i ∈ H (θ) would be willing to sell, even if she were pivotal, because






follows from (8) with λ0 = 1, λi = λ = 0, and vi = v together with θ0
i < θi < γ and q < π.
Given the net trades of ﬁnancial owners, no stakeholder i ∈ H (θ) is pivotal, though, so
that q < π = π (λ0) alone implies that no stakeholder is willing to sell. It follows that
xk +
P
i∈L(θ)\{k} xi = 0 and the tender oﬀer succeeds.
End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Let θ∗ ∈ Θ be given by θ∗
i = 1/m for all i ∈ H and
θ∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ L. At θ∗ the eﬃcient production plan, λ = Λ(θ∗) = 0, is chosen by the
shareholder assembly, because by c < v it follows that γ > θ∗
i = 1/m > θ∗
j = 0 for all i ∈ H
and all j ∈ L. Consider an oﬀer (q,x) such that xj > 0 for some j ∈ L. If (q,x) is a control












must hold, where λ0 = Λ(θ∗ + x) > 0. This implies that q ≤ π (λ0). Denote by H0 ⊆ H the
set of high-valuation sellers, that is i ∈ H0 ⊆ H ⇔ xi < 0. The set H0 must be nonempty,
26because
Pn
i=1 xi = 0, xj > 0 for j ∈ L, and xk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ L by θ∗ +x ≥ 0. But for any

























that is, no i ∈ H0 is willing to accept the sales oﬀer—a contradiction.
There is the possibility, though, that no i ∈ H0 is pivotal, for instance, if xj ≥ 2/m
and all i ∈ H0 tender their shares. Then, given that all others sell, i ∈ H0 sells only if
q ≥ π (λ0). Therefore, if (q,x) is a control trade, q = π (λ0). But this and the hypothesis
that no high-valuation type is pivotal implies that no trader can strictly proﬁt from trade.
Hence, this does not qualify as a control trade either.
There remains the possibility that a high-valuation type j ∈ H buys xj > γ −1/m > 0,











































It follows that there can be neither a control trade with xi > 0 for some i ∈ L, nor one with
xi > 0 for some i ∈ H. Since x ≤ 0 implies x = 0 by the deﬁnition of an oﬀer, it follows
that θ∗ is universally uncontestable.
(b) At any θ ∈ Θ, where λ = Λ(θ) > 0, consider the oﬀer (q,x) with q = π (λ) + ε for
some small ε with 0 < ε < λ∆(γm − 1), xi = −θi for all i ∈ L, and xi = 1/m − θi for all
i ∈ H. Then (7) implies for i ∈ L with θi > 0 that







= θiε > 0




















for ε suﬃciently small.
End of Proof.
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